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The Battle for the Wrong Mistake:
Risk Salience in Canadian Refugee
Status Decision-making

Canadian refugee status adjudicators must choose between two opposing bodies
of law, one of which resolves doubt in the claimant’s favour and the other at the
claimant’s expense. How do they decide which to prefer? How do they decide
whether it would be better to risk accepting an unfounded claim or to risk rejecting
a well-founded one? This paper explores one potentially relevant factor: the salience
of the harms that decision-makers associate with potential risk outcomes. A brief
account of recent events in Canadian refugee law history, beginning with the refugee
law reforms of former Conservative Immigration Minister Jason Kenney, shows how
risk salience can be manipulated. For each refugee claim to be heard on its own
merits, the law cannot leave adjudicators to decide for themselves which kind of
error to prefer. It must recognize that sending a refugee home to persecution is the
wrong mistake.

Les arbitres canadiens du statut de réfugié doivent choisir entre deux arsenaux
juridiques opposés, dont l’un tranche en faveur du demandeur d’asile et l’autre aux
frais de ce dernier. Comment décident-ils lequel préférer? Comment décident-ils s’il
vaut mieux prendre le risque d’accepter une demande non fondée ou de rejeter une
demande fondée? Le présent article explore un facteur potentiellement pertinent :
l’importance des préjudices que les décideurs associent aux résultats des risques
potentiels. Un bref compte rendu des événements récents dans l’histoire du droit
canadien des réfugiés, à commencer par les réformes du droit des réfugiés de
l’ancien ministre conservateur de l’Immigration Jason Kenney, montre comment on
peut manipuler l’importance du risque. Pour que chaque revendication du statut de
réfugié soit entendue sur le fond, la loi ne peut laisser les arbitres décider eux-mêmes
du type d’erreur qu’ils préfèrent. Il doit reconnaître que le renvoi d’un réfugié chez lui
pour être persécuté est la mauvaise décision et une erreur.


+LODU\(YDQV&DPHURQLVDOHFWXUHULQWKH(WKLFV6RFLHW\DQG/DZ3URJUDPDW7ULQLW\&ROOHJHDW
WKH8QLYHUVLW\RI7RURQWRD66+5&SRVWGRFWRUDOIHOORZDQGDGMXQFWSURIHVVRUDW2VJRRGH+DOO/DZ
6FKRRODQGDIRUPHUUHIXJHHODZ\HU)RUWKHLUYHU\KHOSIXOFRPPHQWVRQHDUOLHUGUDIWVRIWKLVDUWLFOH
VKHZRXOGOLNHWRWKDQN0DLUL&RZDQ6HDQ5HKDDJDQGWKHDQRQ\PRXVUHYLHZHUVDWWKH'DOKRXVLH
/DZ-RXUQDO
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To make ¿ndings of fact in any legal domain, decision-makers must turn
their doubts into certainty. They must decide by the end of the fact-¿nding
process which of the relevant allegations to accept and which to reject. To
do this, they must resolve all relevant doubts, either in favour of accepting
a given allegation or in favour of rejecting it. But which way should they
err? Should they more readily run the risk of accepting a false allegation
or of rejecting a true one? Which of these two potential mistakes would
be worse?
Burdens of proof, standards of proof and presumptions are the law’s
tools for managing this process, for controlling whether and to what extent
an allegation should “pay the price” for the decision-maker’s doubts.1 If
every decision-maker could decide for herself how she would prefer to
resolve her uncertainty—and could change her preference in any case,
for any reason—decisions would be arbitrary and unjust.2 The law’s fact¿nding structures therefore have one job: they work together to try to
constrain decision-makers to follow the law’s error preference rather than
their own.
Blackstone’s Maxim is one of the common law’s most famous notions:
“It is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”3
The criminal law’s strong theoretical preference for erring in favour of the
accused is why its fact-¿nding structures work as they do. The prosecution
bears the burden of proof; the standard of proof is very high, proof of guilt
“beyond a reasonable doubt”; and many presumptions favour the accused

1.
Richard H Gaskins, %XUGHQV RI 3URRI LQ 0RGHUQ 'LVFRXUVH (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1992) 3. See discussion in Hilary Evans Cameron, 5HIXJHH/DZ¶V)DFW¿QGLQJ&ULVLV7UXWK
5LVNDQGWKH:URQJ0LVWDNH(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), Chapter 1. See also
Dayna Nadine Scott, “Shifting the Burden of Proof: The Precautionary Principle and Its Potential for
the ‘Democratization’ of Risk” in Law Commission of Canada, ed, /DZ 5LVN(Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2005) 50 (“[w]ho should be burdened by—and who should bene¿t from—the limits of our
understanding?” at 51). Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, “A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderanceof-the-Evidence Standard” (1983) 131:5 U Pa L Rev 1159 at 1173; Michael L DeKay, “The Difference
between Blackstone-Like Error Ratios and Probabilistic Standards of Proof” (1996) 21:1 Law & Soc
Inquiry 95 at 131; John Kaplan, “Decision Theory and the Fact¿nding Process” (1968) 20:6 Stan L
Rev 1065.
2.
As Kaplan explains, while the law’s preference for erring on the side of the accused is a
“fundamental tenet” of the criminal law, the accused’s reputation and the nature of the crime (in
particular, whether it is one with a high likelihood of recidivism) are factors that might reasonably
inÀate the jury’s perception of the harm of a false acquittal. Since these are eminently rational
considerations, the problem that the law faces in trying to ensure that all cases are decided according
to the same set of decision-making principles—“one of the basic dilemmas of our criminal system”—
is in essence how to stop jurors from reasoning rationally. Kaplan, LELG at 1074-1077.
3.
William Blackstone, &RPPHQWDULHVRQWKH/DZVRI(QJODQG352 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press,
1769) cited in DeKay, VXSUD note 1 at 96. See also Alexander Volokh, “QGuilty Men” (1997) 146 U
Pa L Rev173.
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and few favour the prosecution.4 While the criminal justice system may
in fact treat any number of accused very badly, and while the law’s fact¿nding structures may not constrain its judges and juries in practice, at the
level of its legal theory, the criminal law resolves doubt ¿rmly in favour
of the accused.5
As I have argued elsewhere, Canadian refugee law, in sharp contrast,
leaves its decision-makers—the members of the Refugee Protection
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board—entirely free to resolve
their doubts in accordance with their own preferences.6 This is because
our Federal Court, which develops Canadian refugee law in its judgments
on review of the Board’s decisions, is itself profoundly split about which
kind of mistake Board members ought to prefer: should they more readily
risk granting a refugee claim that should have been denied or denying
a claim that should have been granted? As a result, the Court interprets
refugee law’s fact-¿nding structures differently in two opposing bodies
of law, one of which resolves doubt in the claimant’s favour and the other
at the claimant’s expense. A Board member can choose which of these
bodies of law she prefers to apply—and can change her preference in
any case, for any reason. In a refugee hearing, a context characterized by
“radical uncertainty”7 where doubt lurks around every corner, the ability
to tip the balance in either direction will often allow members to reach
either conclusion on the same evidence. I have argued that this may help
to explain the “vast disparities”8 in the Board members’ acceptance rates.
How, then, do Board members decide which kind of mistake to prefer?
This paper looks at one potentially relevant factor. As discussed below,
4.
See Evans Cameron, VXSUD note 1.
5.
See Kaplan, VXSUD note 1 at 1075. Several studies of jury decision-making have also noted that
jurors may apply their own interpretations of both the civil and criminal standards of proof that differ
from the law’s interpretations. See, e.g., Rita James Simon & Linda Mahan, “Quantifying Burdens
of Proof” (1971) 5:3 Law & Soc’y Rev 319; Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, “Loss Aversion, Omission
Bias, and the Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation” (2012) 41:1 J Leg Stud 165; James Andreoni,
“Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?” (1991)
22:3 Rand J Economics 385.
6.
Evans Cameron, VXSUD note 1.
7.
Audrey Macklin, “Coming Between Law and the State: Church Sanctuary for Non-citizens,”
Nexus, University of Toronto, Faculty of Law (Fall/Winter 2005) 49, 51, cited in Trish Luker,
“Decision Making Conditioned by Radical Uncertainty: Credibility Assessment at the Australian
Refugee Review Tribunal” (2013) 25 Intl J Refugee L 502 at 515.
8.
Sean Rehaag, “2017 Refugee Claim Data and IRB Member Recognition Rates” &DQDGLDQ
&RXQFLO IRU 5HIXJHHV (26 March 2018), online: <http://ccrweb.ca/en/2017-refugee-claim-data>. As
Rehaag notes, while grant rates can of course be expected to vary as a function of the claimant’s
country of origin, “substantial differences” persist when this factor is taken into account. This level of
disparity observed in 2017 “is consistent with similar ¿ndings from prior years for Canada’s previous
and new refugee determination systems.” See also Sean Rehaag, “Troubling Patterns in Canadian
Refugee Adjudication” (2008) 39:2 Ottawa L Rev 335.
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error preference judgments are affected by the salience of the harms that
decision-makers associate with potential outcomes. ‘Salience’ captures the
idea that for any decision-maker some types of harm will resonate more
strongly than others: some kinds of harms will capture their imagination,
will “strike them more forcefully,” will “stand out.”9 To illustrate this idea,
and its relevance to what I have called “refugee law’s fact-¿nding crisis,”10
this paper will give a brief account of some recent events in Canadian
refugee law history, beginning with the refugee law reforms of former
Conservative Immigration Minister Jason Kenney.
7KHEDWWOHIRUWKHZURQJPLVWDNHLQUHIXJHHVWDWXVGHWHUPLQDWLRQ
As Minister Jason Kenney went about overhauling the country’s refugee
determination system in the early 2010s, he claimed time and again that
change was needed because Board members were too often making one
kind of mistake: giving refugee protection to those who did not need
it. Although Kenney proudly maintained that the Canadian system was
head and shoulders above the rest—“the model system in the world
for refugee protection”11—when our Board recognized more refugees
than decision-makers in other countries, this did not suggest to Kenney
that this ‘model’ system was working, catching those who elsewhere
were slipping through the cracks. It rather implied, on its face, “a fairly
signi¿cant degree of abuse.”12 The Board’s surplus positive decisions were
not merely exceptional, in other words, they were PLVWDNHV. And Kenney
had complained for years that these mistakes were coming at too high a
price. Among other things, the Board’s “incredibly high acceptance rate
for refugee claimants” was making Canada “the laughingstock of the
world.”13
Yet two potential mistakes hang in the balance in a refugee hearing.
The Board might mistakenly grant refugee protection, or it might
9.
Seumas Miller, “Co-ordination, Salience and Rationality” (1991) 29 Southern J Philosophy359
at 362. See also Els CM van Schie & Joop van der Pligt, “InÀuencing Risk Preference in Decision
Making: The Effects of Framing and Salience” (1995) 63:3 Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes264.
10. Evans Cameron, VXSUD note 1.
11. Canada, Parliament, +RXVHRI&RPPRQV'HEDWHV, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 146, No 108 (23 April
2012) at 1755 (Hon Jason Kenney). See also House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship
and Immigration, (YLGHQFH, 41-1, No 31 (26 April 2012) (Hon Jason Kenney); House of Commons,
Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, (YLGHQFH,
41-1, Issue 20 (18 June 2012) (Hon Jason Kenney). 
12. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, (YLGHQFH, 40-2, No
37 (1 December 2009) at 0955 (Hon Jason Kenney).
13. Canada, Parliament, +RXVHRI&RPPRQV +DQVDUG 37th Parl, 1st Sess, No 8- (18 September
2011) at 1300 (quoting with approval a comment from an immigration lawyer, Sergio Karas, cited in
the 1DWLRQDO3RVWduring the debates by Hon Jason Kenney).
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mistakenly deny it. “As every elementary handbook of statistics will tell
you,” reducing the likelihood of one of these errors means increasing
the likelihood of the other kind.14 Reforming the refugee system so that
it generates fewer mistaken grants, then, means accepting that it will
generate more mistaken rejections.
To convince Canadians that this trade-off was desirable, Kenney had
to decrease their concern with the possibility of rejecting genuine claims,
or else make the possibility of accepting unfounded claims so worrying
that it would eclipse the fact that his changes would send more people
back to persecution (as noted at the time by the UN Committee Against
Torture, among others).15 In the language of cognitive psychology, he had
to manipulate the salience of these two associated risks. Throughout his
campaign to win over Canadians’ error preference, Kenney used classic
rhetorical techniques to turn the knobs: to make one type of harm more
salient at the expense of the other.
Researchers have long observed that one of the reasons why “salience
seems to have a profound impact on decisional preference”16 is because
decision-makers tend to “overemphasize the information their minds
focus on.”17 In deciding which of two risky options to prefer, a decisionmaker may simply be struck by one worst-case scenario and “neglect”
the other.18 By “selectively emphasizing” one type of harm, researchers
are able to frame a problem so as to increase the salience of that harm,
thereby manipulating their subjects’ perception of which potential worstcase outcome is preferable.19 To this end, sheer repetition is a powerful

14. Henk van den Belt & Bart Gremmen, “Between the Precautionary Principle and ‘Sound Science’:
Distributing the Burden of Proof” (2002) 15:1 J Agricultural & Environmental Ethics103 at 118, cited
in Scott, VXSUD note 1 at 62. See also Michael J Saks & Samantha L Neufeld, “Convergent evolution
in law and science: the structure of decision-making under uncertainty” (2011) 10:2 L Probability &
Risk133 at 138; RS Radford, “Statistical Error and Legal Error: Type One and Type Two Errors and
the Law” (1988) 21:3 Loy LA L Rev843 at 851, 872.
15. See Terry Milewski, “Canada accused of ‘complicity’ in torture in UN report: UN body says
changes to Canada’s immigration laws risk human rights violations,” &%& 1HZV (1 June 2012);
Canadian Council for Refugees & Amnesty International Canada, Media Release, “New refugee
system does not treat refugees fairly or protect those most at risk” (4 December 2012).
16. Van Schie & Van der Pligt, VXSUD note 9 at 274. For a review see Cass R Sunstein, :RUVW
&DVH6FHQDULRV(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007) Chapter 1; Cass R Sunstein, /DZVRI
)HDU%H\RQGWKH3UHFDXWLRQDU\3ULQFLSOH(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) Chapter 4
[Sunstein 2005].
17. Pedro Bordalo, Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, “Salience Theory of Choice Under Risk”
(2012) 127:3 Q J Economics 1243 at 1245.
18. ,ELG at 1245. For a review see Sunstein 2007, VXSUD note 16, Chapter 1; Sunstein 2005, VXSUD
note 16 at 45-49, 89-91, 208-209.
19. Van Schie & Van der Pligt, VXSUD note 9 at 271.
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tool. The more often we hear a statement, the more familiar it feels and the
more it starts to ring true.20
In the lead-up to the legislative changes, Kenney highlighted the
purported harms of mistaken grants at every opportunity, using “such
inÀammatory language that it has changed the terms of the national
debate.”21 As he repeated at every turn, our system was staggering beneath
the weight of a “massive surge” of cheats and liars:22 these “lawbreakers
and queue-jumpers”23 were arriving in droves to “violate our fair rules,”24
“game our system and abuse our generosity.”25 They were costing Canada
¿nancially, “asking where they can get their welfare cheque” upon arrival
at the airport.26 They were costing us politically by forcing us to impose
visas on friendly countries,27 causing a “diplomatic row”28 that was hurting
Canada’s image.29 The fact that people could come to Canada and make
a refugee claim inland, rather than “patiently waiting in the queue”30 to
immigrate, was “an insult to the millions of people who aspire to come

20. “A reliable way to make people believe in falsehoods is frequent repetition, because familiarity
is not easily distinguished from truth.” Daniel Kahneman, 7KLQNLQJ)DVWDQG6ORZ (New York: Farrar,
Straus & Giroux, 2011) 62.
21. Marci McDonald, “And you think Harper is Right Wing: The ascent of Jason Kenney,” 7KH
:DOUXV (May 2014) 27. As one reporter noted, for example, in describing on an open letter that Kenney
wrote to Amnesty International in response to the organization’s criticisms of his ministry, “The tone
of Mr. Kenney’s letter…feels personal. It reads like the kind of letter we sometimes write when we
feel wronged, but then delete before sending. The tone makes sense only if Mr. Kenney recently broke
up with Amnesty International.” Tabatha Southey, “Look out, Unicef. Next Jason Kenney might be
gunning for you,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO (12 August 2011).
22. Cited in -DURVODYY&DQDGD 0LQLVWHURI&LWL]HQVKLSDQG,PPLJUDWLRQ 2011 FC 634 at para 44,
390 FTR 248.
23. Cited in Nicholas Köhler, “A crackdown on queue-jumpers: Will the Tories make bogus refugee
claims an election issue?,” 0DFOHDQ¶V (3 August 2009) 19.
24. Cited in McDonald, VXSUD note 21 at 35.
25. Cited in Campbell Clark, “Minister calls for overhaul of Canada’s refugee system,” 7KH*OREH
DQG0DLO (15 July 2009).
26. Cited in Steven Chase and Tamara Baluja, “Kenney tightens rules for questionable asylum
seekers,” 7KH*OREHDQG0DLO (16 February 2012).
27. See Kenney’s comments quoted in &HUYHQDNRYD Y &DQDGD 0LQLVWHU RI &LWL]HQVKLS DQG
,PPLJUDWLRQ 2010 FC 1281 at para 46, 381 FTR 74 [&HUYHQDNRYD]. See also Prime Minister Stephen
Harper’s comments, cited in Campbell Clark, “Ottawa announces deal to fast-track Mexican refugees,”
7KH*OREHDQG0DLO (14 February 2013) (“On a visit to Mexico in 2009, Mr. Harper even told the
Mexicans the visa restrictions were not their fault, but Canada’s. ‘This is a problem in Canadian
refugee law which encourages bogus claims,’ he said.”); Köhler, VXSUD note 23.
28. Cited in &HUYHQDNRYD, LELG at para 46.
29. See discussion in Köhler, VXSUD note 23; Carl Meyer, “Where’s the beef? Sizing up CanadaMexico relations,” (PEDVV\ (26 May 2010).
30. Cited in Köhler, VXSUD note 23. See also Hon Jason Kenney (Address delivered at the Faculty
of Law, University of Western Ontario, 11 February 2011), Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship
Canada: Newsroom Archives: Speeches for 2011, online: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/
media/speeches/2011/2011-02-11.asp> [“Speech at Western”].
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to Canada legally,”31 and was also jeopardizing their warm welcome:
“when Canadians don’t think the government can control its own borders,
public support for generous levels of immigration drops signi¿cantly.”32 It
was likewise “an insult to the important concept of refugee protection”33
and kept us from doing more to help genuine refugees, who in Kenney’s
esteem were not those who arrive “illegally…on dangerous vessels
across the oceans,”34 but rather those “living in UN refugee camps by the
millions.”35 Moreover, our security was compromised. We had become an
obvious destination for “any serious criminal, any terrorist, any dictator”
with a fake passport.36 And, of course, handing out refugee status to cheats
and liars was rewarding their deception and allowing them to “play this
country for fools.”37
Emphasizing the price that Canada is paying to protect refugees not
only increases our concern with mistaken grants, it also decreases the
salience of the risk of sending them back to persecution. Drawing attention
to the costs inherent in reducing a risk—bringing these costs “on-screen”38
—is an effective way of decreasing its salience. In one study, for example,
parents were very worried about the asbestos in their children’s schools
and demanded that it be removed, even though experts assured them
that it posed only a minimal risk. Once it became clear that removing
the asbestos would cause the schools to be closed for weeks, however,
“parental attitudes turned right around” and asbestos no longer seemed
very dangerous.39 Such studies have led Sunstein to predict, for example,
“that if people were informed that eliminating pesticides would lead to
31. Cited in Köhler, supra note 23. See also “Speech at Western,” ibid.
32. “Speech at Western,” ibid.
33. Cited in Cervenakova, supra note 27 at para 46.
34. “Speech at Western,” supra note 30.
35. Cited in Cervenakova, supra note 27 at para 46. See also discussion in McDonald, supra note
21 at 38. On Kenney’s analysis, when a claimant comes to Canada without authorization “rather than
applying for refugee status at a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees of¿ce abroad,” even
if her claim is genuine, not only is she diverting resources that could be put to better use resettling
refugees from abroad, but “the integrity of our immigration system is compromised, it undermines
the entire immigration process, and it undermines the con¿dence and respect for that process that
we require amongst all of those law-abiding immigrants.” “Speech at Western,” supra note 30. For
discussion and critique of this argument see Andy Lamey, Frontier Justice: The Global Refugee Crisis
and What to Do About It (Toronto: Anchor Canada, 2013) 243-247.
36. “Speech at Western,” supra note 30.
37. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Evidence, 40-3, No
12 (4 May 2010) at 1540 (quoting with approval from an editorial in The Globe and Mail, in comments
to the committee by Hon Jason Kenney). See also House of Commons, Proceedings of the Standing
Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, Evidence, 41-1, Issue 20 (18 June 2012)
(Hon Jason Kenney): “I do not like us being taken for suckers.”
38. See discussion in Sunstein 2005, supra note 16 at 47-49.
39. Ibid at 47-48.
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a signi¿cant cost in the price of apples and oranges, the perceived risk
would go down.”40
In addition, Kenney sought to decrease concern about mistaken denials
by creating the impression of a high base rate of fraudulent claims. No one
knows what percentage of refugee claimants lie to the Board, including
Kenney himself. As his then Director General recently admitted, “We
never really had quanti¿able information on how much fraud there was.”41
But if most claimants are frauds, then mistaken grants are unlikely. This
suggestion may not have much effect on those for whom this kind of harm
is already very worrying—when a risk is salient, “degrees of unlikeliness
seem to provide no comfort”42—but it will have an evident effect on those
who judge its cost, instead, based on some sense of its magnitude and its
likelihood.43 Moreover, rhetoric that works to create the impression of a
high base rate of fraudulent claims can become a self-ful¿lling prophecy.
If members themselves can be made to believe that most claimants are
liars, then since they will be more likely to view claimants with suspicion,
they will be more likely to conclude that they are lying: “investigator
bias” is the well-noted tendency of those looking for deception to ¿nd it
where none exists.44 More negative decisions, in turn, only strengthen the
appearance that many claimants are frauds.
Kenney used several effective methods of creating the impression of a
high base rate of lying claimants. His rhetoric brought the ‘bogus’ refugee
claimant squarely to the forefront of the popular imagination, and one of his
most obvious rhetorical strategies was what psychologists call “imaging
40. Ibid at 49.
41. Quoted in McDonald, supra note 21 at 37. Of note, when Board members ¿nd that a claim is
clearly fraudulent, by law they must indicate this in their decision: the Board must designate the claim
as having ‘no credible basis’ if it is “of the opinion, in rejecting a claim, that there was no credible or
trustworthy evidence on which it could have made a favourable decision” (Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s. 107(2) [IRPA]). In the nine years leading up to Kenney’s changes, the
Board made such a ¿nding in 2.7% of the claims that it decided on the merits, and in the ¿rst two years
of the new system, in 2.6%. “These ¿gures contradict the exaggerated rhetoric about Canada’s refugee
determination process being subject to widespread abuse by fraudulent claimants in the lead up to the
reforms” Angus Grant & Sean Rehaag, “Unappealing: An Assessment of the Limits on Appeal Rights
in Canada’s New Refugee Determination System” (2016) 49:1 UBC L Rev 203 at 253.
42. John Weingart, Waste is a terrible thing to mind: risk, radiation and distrust of government
(Princeton, NJ: Center for Analysis of Public Issues, 2001) 362, cited in Cass R. Sunstein, “Probability
Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law” (2002) 112:1 Yale LJ 61 at 61. See generally Sunstein
2005, supra note 16.
43. For discussion, see Evans Cameron, supra note 1 at Chapter 1.
44. See, e.g., SM Kassin & RJ Norwick, “Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: The Power of
Innocence” (2004) 28:2 L & Human Behavior 211 at 213; Christian A Meissner & Saul M Kassin,
“‘He’s guilty!’: Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception” (2002) 26:5 L & Human
Behavior 469; Karl Ask, Anna Rebelius & Pär Anders Granhag, “The ‘Elasticity’ of Criminal
Evidence: A Moderator of Investigator Bias” (2008) 22 Applied Cognitive Psychology 1245.
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the numerator”:45 he illustrated his arguments with numerous concrete
examples of actual lying claimants.46 Allowing us to picture a particular
person is one of the most effective ways of increasing our impression that
there are many more people like her. It is why advertisements for lotteries
always show a photograph of the winner holding the cheque: so that we
can “image” her, the numerator, and neglect the denominator, the millions
of people who played and lost. And time and again, Kenney used a tactic
that has become a prominent feature of the refugee protection debate
worldwide,47 one that the Court has recently noted is “both unfair and
inaccurate”48 and that reÀects “a grossly simplistic understanding of the
refugee process:”49 implying that any and all rejected claims must have
been fraudulent.50
In sum, Kenney made very astute use of rhetorical tools that inÀuence
how listeners perceive, assess and weigh competing risks to reduce popular
concern with wrongly rejecting refugees and to raise the alarm about the
costs of mistaken grants. Then, in December 2012, he “performed radical
surgery”51 on Canada’s refugee determination system, bringing about “the
most dramatic change since the Second World War.”52
At around the same time, the refugee crisis sparked by the outbreak
of civil war in Syria was intensifying across the Middle East and North

45. See for example Thomas Gilovich, Dale Grif¿n & Daniel Kahneman, Heuristics and Biases:
The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 413-414;
Paul Slovic, Ellen Peters & Melissa L. Finucane, “Affect, Risk, and Decision Making” (2005) 24:4
Health Psychology S35 at S37; Paul Slovic, John Monahan & Donald G. MacGregor, “Violence Risk
Assessment and Risk Communication: The Effects of Using Actual Cases, Providing Instructions and
Employing Probability Versus Frequency Formats” (2000) 24 L & Human Behavior 271.
46. See, e.g., “Speech at Western,” supra note 30.
47. For discussion, see Patricia Tuitt, False Images: The Law’s Construction of the Refugee (London,
UK: Pluto Press, 1996) at 20 (claimants who “fall outside the legal de¿nition of refugee” are seen
“increasingly…as ‘bogus’ or ‘fraudulent.’”).
48. Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v Canada (Attorney General) 2014 FC 651 at para 841
[2015] FCR 267, Mactavish J.
49. Ibid at para 840. As the Court goes on to explain at para 842, “[r]efugee claims are often brought
on the basis of real hardship and genuine suffering. Amongst those whose claims do not succeed
will be individuals who may well have come to Canada because of a real fear of persecution in their
country of origin, but who were unable to meet the strict legal requirements of the refugee de¿nition.”
See also Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 62 (“Some people will, of course, believe
that they are entitled to refugee status and later ¿nd out that others do not agree with them. This is
not an abuse of the asylum process, but a rational response to any number of dif¿cult or desperate
situations.”)
50. See, e.g., “Speech at Western,” supra note 30; comments cited in Cervenakova, supra note 27 at
para 46.
51. Debra Black & Nicholas Keung, “Immigration and refugee system: Canada made controversial
changes in 2012” Toronto Star (29 December 2012).
52. McDonald, supra note 21.
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Africa.53 In September 2015, the photograph of Alan Kurdi, a three-yearold Syrian boy who drowned attempting to reach safety, hit newspapers
around the globe. This photograph has been widely credited with focusing
the world’s attention, at least for a time, on the plight of refugees Àeeing
the region. It is generally accepted that this photograph helped to make
Canada’s response to refugees a “de¿ning issue” of the 2015 national
election, which saw the election of a Prime Minister who ran on the promise
to bring 25,000 Syrian refugees to Canada by the end of that year.54 It has
also been suggested that this photograph had a “disproportionate effect”
on public opinion here because it “hit close to home:”55 members of the
Kurdi family had unsuccessfully applied to come to Canada. For a time,
Alan Kurdi’s little face became the face of mistaken rejection.
Our ability to change the channel when confronted with human suffering
is, of course, profound. But the following year brought a spectacle from
which it was harder to turn away: the 2016 US election and all that followed.
As pollsters must ever remind us, “Canadians aren’t as accepting as we
think.”56 But ‘welcoming’ and ‘generous’ are key aspects of “the way many
Canadians traditionally see themselves.”57 A new government website,
which allowed us “to track the arrival of Syrian refugees in communities
across the country, receive information on how they could help welcome
the refugees, and view photos and stories of refugee resettlement,” bore
the heading “Open Hearts and Welcoming Communities: It’s the Canadian
Way.”58 Crucially, though, we see ourselves as warm and generous not
just in absolute terms but in relative terms: we are a “welcoming land…
unlike our neighbour to the south.”59 Canadians’ opinion of human rights

53. See, e.g., Mark Tran, “UN warns of worst refugee crisis in nearly 20 years” 7KH*XDUGLDQ (19
June 2013), online: <www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/jun/19/refugee-crisis-worldworst-united-nations>; Lindsey Phillips, “Top 10 of 2013 – Issue #4: The Escalating Syrian Refugee
Crisis Challenges the International Community’s Ability to Respond” 0LJUDWLRQ3ROLF\,QVWLWXWH (18
December 2013), online: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/top-10-2013-–-issue-4-escalatingsyrian-refugee-crisis-challenges-international-communitys>.
54. Michelle Zilio, “Survey ¿nds ‘dramatic shift’ in Canadian perceptions of U.S. approach to
human rights,” 7KH *OREH DQG 0DLO (21 August 2017). See also Geordon Omand, “Photo of Alan
Kurdi had disproportionate effect on Canada: observers,” &79 1HZV (1 September 2016); Teresa
Wright, “Alan Kurdi photo left Canadian government scrambling, emails reveal,” 7KH7RURQWR6WDU
(29 April 2018); Victoria M Esses, Leah K Hamilton & Danielle Gaucher, “The Global Refugee Crisis:
Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications for Improving Public Attitudes and Facilitating Refugee
Resettlement” (2017) 11 Social Issues & Policy Rev 78 at 105.
55. Zilio, VXSUD note 54.
56. Angus Reid, “Canadians aren’t as accepting as we think—and we can’t ignore it, writes Angus
Reid,” &%&1HZV(4 October 2016).
57. ,ELG
58. Esses et al., VXSUD note 54 at 105.
59. ,ELG
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in the US started to decline in 2015,60 and even under President Obama,
polls showed that we “associate[d] few positive attributes with the U.S.”61
After President Trump was elected, with esteem for the US “plummeting”
across the globe, Canada showed “the largest such decline of any country
within the Western Hemisphere.”62 In the ¿rst months of 2017, as the US
administration announced that it was temporarily barring the citizens of
seven Muslim-majority countries, along with all refugees, from entering
the country, our opinion of our neighbour’s human rights record reached
its lowest level recorded to that point, and our Prime Minister famously
assured refugees via tweet that “Canadians will welcome you.”63
A risk’s salience may be affected by a decision-maker’s “selfcategorization,” by how she conceives of her own identity in relation to
it.64 Decision-makers’ risk judgments will reliably change in response to
experimental manipulations that affect how they see themselves and their
decision-making role. When reminded of their role as parents, for example,
subjects perceived strangers to be more dangerous and trusted them less.65
When reminded of their own mortality, subjects were more inclined to
support harsh measures to counter the risk of terrorism.66 Legal scholar
and former Board member Audrey Macklin observed years ago that some
members “conceive of their mandate in terms of ful¿lling Canada’s human
rights obligations under the Refugee Convention and Canadian law,” while
others “understand themselves as gatekeepers, tasked with protecting
Canada’s borders from unscrupulous and undeserving migrants who

60. Zilio, VXSUD note 54.
61. Angus Reid Institute, “Canada-U.S. perspectives: ‘sunny ways’ versus gloomy days” (9 March
2016), online: <http://angusreid.org/canada-us-perspectives/>.
62. Alexander Panetta, “World’s opinion of U.S. hits new low under Trump—especially in Canada:
poll,” *OREDO1HZV(18 January 2018).
63. American Civil Liberties Union, “Timeline of the Muslim Ban” (June 2018), online: <www.
aclu-wa.org/pages/timeline-muslim-ban>; Zilio, VXSUD note 54; David Ljunggren & Anna Mehler
Paperny, “Justin Trudeau tweets messages of welcome to refugees as Trump travel ban sets in,” *OREDO
1HZV (28 January 2017).
64. See, e.g., Diederik A Staple, Stephen D Reicher & Russell Spears, “Social identity, availability
and the perception of risk” (1994) 12:1 Social Cognition1. See also Esses et al., VXSUD note 54.
65. Richard P Eibach & Stephen E Mock, “The vigilant parent: Parental role salience affects parents’
risk perceptions, risk aversion, and trust in strangers” (2011) 47:3 J Experimental Social Psychology
694.
66. Matthew B Kugler & Joel Cooper, “Still an American? Mortality Salience and Treatment of
Suspected Terrorists” (2010) 40:12 J Applied Social Psychology3130; Mark J Landau et al, “Deliver
Us From Evil: The Effects of Mortality Salience and Reminders of 9/11 on Support for President
George W Bush” (2004) 30:9 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin1136.
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abuse the asylum system to gain entry.”67 Kenney’s rhetoric emphasized
the latter identity. In the ¿rst months of 2017, looking south with mouths
agape, more Board members may have been reminded of the former.
And if af¿rming this identity was pleasing, if it brought with it a warm
satis¿ed feeling—smugness, if you will—this would only have intensi¿ed
its effect on risk salience. The more appealing a decision, the less we
worry about its attendant risks.68 If preferring mistaken grants allowed
members to identify themselves as Canadians—as a different and better
kind of creature than their southern neighbours—they may more easily
have looked past any harms that they associated with accepting unfounded
claims.
When Board members now look south, however, they may well
be struck by a different vision. Canada does not accept refugee claims
at of¿cial ‘ports of entry’ along our southern border on the increasingly
untenable premise that asylum seekers will get a fair hearing in the US.69
Those who enter Canada at unauthorized crossings, however, may make
refugee claims at a government of¿ce inland. By August 2018, around
30,000 people had side-stepped our ports of entry in this way in order to
make refugee claims.70

67. Audrey Macklin, “Refugee Roulette in the Canadian Casino” in Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew
I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag eds, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication and
Proposals for Reform (New York: New York University Press, 2009) 135 at 158 [Macklin, “Refugee
Roulette”]. See also François Crépeau & Delphine Nakache “Critical Spaces in the Canadian Refugee
Determination System: 1989–2002” (2008) 20:1 Intl J Refugee L 50 at 112-113.
68. See Paul Slovic, Ellen Peters & Melissa L. Finucane, “Affect, Risk, and Decision Making” (2005)
24 Health Psychology S35 at S37; Hilary Evans Cameron, “Subjective Fear and Risk Theory: The
Role of Risk Perception, Risk Assessment and Risk Management in Refugee Status Determinations”
(2008) 20:4 Intl J Refugee L 567 at 570-571.
69. See Teresa Wright, “Canada faces mounting pressure to end safe third country agreement with
U.S.” CTV News (21 June 2018).
70. Government of Canada, “Asylum Claims” (Ottawa: 13 August 2018), online: <https://www.
canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/asylum-claims.html>. In sum, over
30,000 claimants have crossed into Canada without authorization since the 2016 US election. Éric
Grenier, “Justin Trudeau is losing the argument on border crossings, poll suggests,” CBC News (3
August 2018).
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The images of masses of claimants crossing ‘illegally’ into Canada
have caught and held the public’s attention.71 For a majority of Canadians,
the fear that the country “is being invaded”72 has become powerfully
salient; pollsters predict that it may in fact threaten the government’s
chances of re-election.73 At least one Canadian commentator has called
on the government “to build a wall.”74 Moreover, 40% of respondents to a
recent poll, and nearly two-thirds of those who identify as Conservative,
believe that these claimants are “mostly economic migrants” and not
refugees.75 “The perception is that these people are illegal and that they’re
violating Canada’s borders and that they’re just queue jumpers trying to
get freebies on welfare.”76 In short, the sheer number of new arrivals, and
the manner of their arrival, are greatly increasing popular concern with the
purported harms of mistaken grants.
Conclusion
If you had to make a refugee claim at some point during this historical
narrative, when would you choose to do it? If you chose the period when
Kenney was hard-selling his plan to limit ‘bogus’ claims, you chose
poorly. At that point, the Board’s acceptance rate, which had “declined
substantially since 2006 when the Conservative Party took of¿ce,” was

71. In a recent poll, “[f]ully 70 per cent of respondents…said they were either ‘following it in the
news and discussing it with friends and family’ or ‘seeing some media coverage and having the odd
conversation.’” Grenier, supra note 70. Of note, under both Canadian and international law, a person
will not be penalized for entering a country without authorization for the purpose of claiming asylum,
and moreover, Canadian immigration law “does not make it illegal to enter Canada using informal
border crossings, as long as a person reports to border services without delay.” Lobat Sadrehashemi
& Lorne Waldman, “Four myths about Canada’s border crossings,” Ottawa Citizen (15 May 2018).
Whether claimants crossing from the US at unauthorized entry points are nonetheless arriving
‘illegally’ has, however, been the subject of some debate. For discussion, see Stephanie Levitz, “Are
asylum seekers walking across the border into Canada actually breaking the law?,” Global News
(9 March 2017); Tristin Hopper, “Irregular or illegal? The ¿ght over what to call the thousands of
migrants streaming into Canada,” The National Post (10 July 2018).
72. Sigal Samuel, “‘There’s a Perception That Canada Is Being Invaded’: Justin Trudeau’s
government has started rejecting more refugee claims from migrants who cross the U.S.-Canada
border on foot,” The Atlantic (26 May 2018).
73. Grenier, supra note 70; Angus Reid Institute, “Two-thirds call irregular border crossings a ‘crisis,’
more trust Scheer to handle issue than Trudeau,” (3 August 2018), online: <http://angusreid.org/safethird-country-asylum-seekers/>; Bruce Anderson & David Coletto, “Liberals and Conservatives neck
and neck as the race to 2019 takes shape,” Abacus Data (31 July 2018), online: <http://abacusdata.ca/
liberals-and-conservatives-neck-and-neck-as-the-race-to-2019-takes-shape/>.
74. Anthony Furey, “Someone has to say it—it’s time to build a wall at Roxham Rd.,” Toronto Sun
(22 May 2018).
75. Grenier, supra note 70; Angus Reid Institute, supra note 73.
76. Samuel, supra note 72.
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approaching an all-time low.77 If you chose the time when Prime Minister
Trudeau was tweeting Canada’s welcome to refugees, you chose wisely.
At that point, our Refugee Board was accepting a greater percentage of
claims than it had at any point in the previous 27 years.78
Myriad other factors affect the Board’s acceptance rate in signi¿cant
ways, of course.79 But as Macklin notes, “it would be naïve to suggest
that decision makers are impervious to the political currents circulating
around them.”80 There is ample evidence of the power of political and
media rhetoric to sway public opinion about refugees, both positively and
negatively,81 and as the Federal Court has observed, Board members make
their decisions “in the glare of…political and public attention.”82 Or as
Lord Sedley of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales has put it: “You
can attend ¿fty social gatherings, you can drink in a hundred bars, where
the conversation never comes remotely near the problems of eviction or
bankruptcy; but it’s unusual to be in any gathering where immigration
does not sooner or later come up.”83
Policy concerns have no place in a refugee hearing room.84 A Board
member’s sole responsibility is to determine whether the claimant needs
protection. Members have no broader mandate to save Canada money, to
spare it embarrassment, or to promote a particular vision of the social order.
In her study of the Board’s institutional culture, however, political scientist
Rebecca Hamlin noted that its members at times came under considerable

77. Debra Black, “Acceptance rates for refugees to Canada decline substantially since 2006,”
The Toronto Star (1 November 2012); Sean Rehaag, “2012 Refugee Claim Data and IRB Member
Recognition Rates,” Canadian Council for Refugees (13 May 2013), online: <http://ccrweb.ca/
en/2012-refugee-claim-data>.
78. Tara Carman, “Canada’s acceptance rate of asylum seekers is the highest in 27 years—here’s
why,” CBC News (7 February 2018).
79. See, e.g., Carman, ibid.
80. Macklin, “Refugee Roulette,” supra note 67 at 140.
81. See Danielle Gaucher et al, “Changes in the Positivity of Migrant Stereotype Content: How
System-Sanctioned Pro-Migrant Ideology Can Affect Public Opinions of Migrants” (2018) 9:2 Social
Psychological and Personality Science 223; Esses et al, supra note 54.
82. Geza v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (CA) 2006 FCA 124 at para 55, 267
DLR (4th) 54 [Geza].
83. Sir Stephen Sedley, “Asylum: Can the Judiciary Maintain its Independence?” (International
Association of Refugee Law Judges World Conference, April 2002) cited in Angela Barisic, Credibility
Assessment of Testimony in Asylum Procedures: an Interdisciplinary Analysis (LLM Thesis, Lund
University Faculty of Law, 2015) at 11.
84. Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 SCR 982 at para
48, 28. See also Geza, supra note 82; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Pearce
2006 FC 492 at para 31, 290 FTR 287, in the context of a vacation determination (Blanchard J): “The
refugee protection provision of the IRPA provides for the adjudication of rights and entitlements in
respect to refugee claimants and not the balancing of competing interests.”

7KH%DWWOHIRUWKH:URQJ0LVWDNH5LVN6DOLHQFH
LQ&DQDGLDQ5HIXJHH6WDWXV'HFLVLRQPDNLQJ



pressure to make negative decisions on policy grounds.85 Hamlin explained
that there was “no clear mechanism for how politicians or policymakers
can force the [Board] to crack down and be less generous.”86 Yet as long
as the law allows members to resolve their doubts as they choose, none is
needed. Convincing them that granting refugee status is the wrong mistake
will achieve the same result.
Sending a refugee home to persecution is the wrong mistake. This
error preference, anchored in the Refugee Convention, is as fundamental
to refugee law as Blackstone’s Maxim is to the criminal law.87 Fact-¿nding
structures that entrench this foundational normative principle are refugee
law’s strongest tool for protecting these life and death decisions from
what Lord Sedley calls “the ambient pressure” on decision-makers “to
put a ¿nger in the dyke, to stem the tide, to stop the rot; to reject the
stories they hear from asylum-seekers so that they can be sent home.”88
Without a coherent and principled law of fact-¿nding, it is too much to
hope that each refugee claim will be heard on its own merits. As the harms
of mistaken grants become more salient with each unauthorized border
crossing, Canadian refugee law must ¿x this elemental Àaw at its core.

85. Rebecca Hamlin, Let Me Be A Refugee: Administrative Justice and the Politics of Asylum in the
United States, Canada, and Australia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 97.
86. Ibid.
87. For this argument, see Evans Cameron, supra note 1.
88. Cited in Barisic, supra note 83.

